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Abstract – Current firewalls and intrusion detection systems 
are generally designed to protect a single gateway in order to 
provide protection for machines residing behind the gateway 
on an internal network. When considering a network 
incorporating multiple gateways across a range of IP 
addresses exposed to the Internet, interesting data can be 
gathered with regard to the types of scans occurring across 
these gateways from the outside. The validity of using a 
central server to amalgamate, reduce and analyse the log files 
of each gateway is investigated in order to examine the 
activities of the scans across multiple gateways and port 
numbers. The results from this analysis can then be used to 
act against an attack through heuristic driven rule creation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  Current   intrusion  detection   systems  and  firewalls   are 
 designed to operate on a single gateway as an individual 
location separate to the other components of the network 
(or as an individual listening sensor monitoring network 
traffic). This results in them not having access to the 
contextual information of what is occurring to the network 
as a whole; which frequently involves other gateways to 
other networks and the internet. 
  The most  fundamental  element in  virtually  all  intrusion 
detection system is the presence of a log file. Audit log files 
record the events that occur on a computer system, along 
with a time-stamp and other identifiers such as the user or 
IP address.  Without this critical information it is 
impossible to know what operations have been performed 
on the system. The log files used within this study were 
from serial gateways (entry points) to a network. 
  The following paper will describe the analysis processes 
and results of an examination of an Audit log that was 
amalgamated from multiple gateways across an entire class 
C IP address range. Attacks that are being carried out 
against the network as a whole can be responded to, pre-
empting the attack’s continuation against other gateways on 
the network. 
INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
  Audit  log files  have  primarily  been  used in  the  past  to 
analyse how an attack occurred upon a system after it has 
finished [1]. Clifford Stoll [2] in his book The Cuckoo’s 
Egg details how he tracked a series of attacks by a hacker 
on and through his system by printing out his activities and 
laboriously manually analysing what the hacker had done. 
During the 1980’s audit logs changed from being massive 
mounds of week long printouts to being stored 
electronically on the system. Developments in pattern 
matching techniques allowed for automated analysis of 
electronically stored audit logs [3]; these were the first 
intrusion detection systems. During the 1990’s advances in 
computing power enabled the analysis of audit logs to 
occur in real-time, thus allowing these intrusion detection 
systems to respond immediately to attacks [4]. 
  Before analysis can occur the data stored within the file is 
filtered, discarding information that is irrelevant to the 
analysis. Feature extraction is a further process of log 
reduction; it examines the log file entries, extracting 
specific relevant information and again discarding the 
remainder. These methods facilitate fast efficient extraction 
of audit log data. Once the relevant data has been extracted 
the analysis can take place; there are two main methods by 
which Log File Analysis is undertaken: Anomaly Detection 
and Signature Detection. 
  Anomaly  detection  ID  systems  require a  profile of each 
 user or user group to be made to enable the system to 
“learn” what comprises normal behaviour [5, 6]. The 
behaviour model is then compared to user actions upon the 
system, searching for behaviour that does not fit the model; 
this behaviour is then classed as abnormal behaviour and 
treated as an intrusion. 
  Anomaly  detection  is  broader than just mapping profiles  
of human usage. It is also applicable to processes and 
network access or usage [7]. Network traffic analysis also 
yields profiles of normal usage that can be used in 
monitoring network traffic for anomalies and thus to detect 
attacks.  
  Signature detection searches audit logs for known attacks, 
matching malicious behaviour to pre-defined signatures. 
Signature or misuse detection has a database of attack 
signatures against which it can compare network event 
patterns in order to discover an attack. This results in 
signature detection systems being able to be operational 
directly after they are installed without the need for any 
training of the system [6].Existing signature based intrusion 
detection systems examine audit logs within the context of 
a single gateway, and do not therefore protect systems from 
a signature that in actuality is spread across several 
gateways. It is this shortfall that is examined in this paper. 
 
MULTIPLE GATEWAY ANALYSIS 
 
  Current  Intrusion  Detection  Systems  using  signature or  
anomaly detection (or indeed combinations of them both) 
work effectively upon a single gateway or network device, 
however they lack the context of what is occurring across 
the entire network. Network infrastructure need to be 
contextually aware to be truly effective and efficient. An 
example of this can be seen in early packet filtering 
firewalls that lacked the contextual information of session 
data, and thus somewhat needlessly and laboriously filtered 
each packet within a session, ignoring the previous 
conclusion that the packets were not malicious in content. 
Likewise, multiple gateways across a single network could 
each be being (trivially) attacked simultaneously, each 
largely ignoring the attack, when in reality the attack is 
occurring across the whole network and is of a serious 
concern. 
  To be able to efficiently monitor and act upon such attacks 
a centralized analysis module needs to operate, having 
access to the complete audit logs of each gateway or sensor 
upon the network so as to preserve the network context. 
The Log amalgamation allows for signature and anomaly 
detection methods to be implemented network wide, thus 
allowing for a unified defence across the multiple gateways 
of the network. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
  The   implementation  utilises   actual  audit  data  from  a  
gateway range that consists of multiple remote gateways 
along with the central server (ns1). Ns1 is bound to the IP 
addresses of almost a complete C-class running from 0 to 
252 in the last octet. This acts as an excellent range of 
‘virtual’ consecutive gateways, as it will appear externally 
as though there are 253 separate machines when really each 
IP address will report to the same machine.  The audit log 
still reports which IP address within this range was probed, 
meaning that it is possible to analyse the data from this 
single machine as though it were 253 separate gateway 
machines (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Audit Log Amalgamation. 
 
  The  majority of the  results  discussed  within  this  paper  
were gathered from port probes that covered this IP range. 
One of the goals of the system is to develop an effective 
threshold level of probes which if passed would result in 
action being taken to protect the network as a whole. 
The system developed to obtain results consists of two 
separate modules – an analysis module and a tracking 
module. A database is utilised to store the processed data. 
  The analysis module is developed to maintain an overall 
image of the state of the system at any given time. It 
analyses every incoming log entry, or an archived log file, 
and updates a table in the database which specifies which 
source IP addresses may be of interest. Rather than keeping 
a database entry for every instance of each IP within the 
log, it only makes one entry for each individual IP address 
and then increments a count for all subsequent instances 
along with additional Boolean information indicating if an 
IP has scanned more than a single gateway, or port. 
   The   count  that  is  recorded, is  the  value  used  by  the  
threshold or heuristic that dictates how long an IP address 
can probe the network before it is banned upon all the 
gateways; this enables the analysis and tracking module to 
have a window of opportunity to gather the required 
information to assess whether or not an IP is conducting a 
multiple gateway attack and set a Boolean multiple 
gateway attack value. 
  The  tracking  module  is  developed  to  follow  the  exact  
activities of individual IP addresses which have been 
deemed to be performing suspicious, or potentially 
interesting, types of scans across multiple gateways or port 
numbers. It creates a database entry for each item of 
activity within the log file from the IP addresses that it is 
tracking. This results in a highly verbose, yet extremely 
comprehensive, record of the activities of these particular 
IP addresses. This data can then be analysed to gain an 
insight into the methods used for these scans. 
  The aim of these two modules is to track the activities of 
IP addresses across the gateway range in an attempt to 
recognise any patterns or methods of attack that are 
currently being overlooked by the existing security 
infrastructure examining them each singularly. 
 
RESULTS 
 
  The   results  that  have  been   ascertained   fall   into  two  
categories, one for each module, Analysis Results and 
Tracking Results. 
 
  Single Gateway Multiple 
Gateways 
Log 1     
Source IP 
Addresses 5990 776 
% of Total 88.5 11.5 
Log 2   
Source IP 
Addresses 67029 8948 
% of Total 88 12 
Table 1. Individual IP address Statistics. 
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Analysis Module Results 
 
  The analysis module records a set of information on each 
IP which probes one of the gateways on the network; it 
records the number of times this IP has probed the network, 
whether or not it has probed more than one gateway, what 
port it probed on and whether or not it has probed multiple 
ports. When examining these data sets the following simple 
statistic table can be identified (Table 1). 
  During the 10-day study period (September 1st till 10th 
2003) 6766 individual IP addresses probed the gateways on 
the network; of these 776 (11.5% of the total) probed more 
than one of the gateways. This demonstrates that there is a 
sizeable risk to systems from malicious users who are 
approaching gateway access at a network wide level, thus 
justifying central processing of audit data to retain network 
context. Realising that the presence and mode of attack is 
present, however, is only the first step to combating the 
problem itself. Detecting when these attacks are taking 
place with reasonable efficiency is the true goal of the 
Analysis module.  
  Upon  further  examination  of  the  data  collected  by  the 
 analysis module, it is possible to group the source IP 
addresses based on the total number of probes sent. Fig. 2 
shows that the vast majority (83%) of source IP addresses 
sent only 3 or fewer probes against the network, indicating 
that perhaps it could be an appropriate level to test a 
threshold level heuristic. There are also slight increases at 6 
and 9 also which were tested as threshold levels. This 
heuristic was then used in conjunction with the Boolean 
value stored for whether or not an IP has probed more than 
one gateway to classify source IP’s, creating a less coarse 
heuristic rule set. 
  The results showed that at a threshold level of 3 only 3.2% 
of IP’s were classified as potentially performing scans on 
multiple gateways. With the optimum of 11.5% to get all 
potential malicious probes it is a relatively poor result. By 
comparison, as the threshold level was increased to the 
levels of 6 and 9, the result returned were 8.3% and 10% 
respectively. These results were much more acceptable, 
however not quite at the levels desired to achieve an 
acceptable efficiency. 
  Fig. 3 illustrates the final distribution after testing several 
other threshold levels. The optimum level of efficiency was 
found to be when operating an 11 probe threshold. The 
second log listed in Table 1 was analysed  after these initial 
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Fig. 2. Distribution of port probe attempts 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Threshold Value
%
 
Ef
fe
c
tiv
e
n
e
ss
 
o
f d
e
te
c
tio
n
 
Fig. 3. Effectiveness of Detecting IP address probing Multiple Gateways 
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Fig 4 Ten days of gateway activity recorded by the Tracker Module 
results were discovered and validated the threshold level 
proposed [8]. 
 
Tracking Module Results 
 
  The tracking module produced very interesting results by 
using the flags that were triggered by the analysis module 
as a guide to which source IP addresses were worth 
tracking. The graph in Figure 4 depicts the ten days of 
Tracker activity on all source IP addresses that probed the 
gateway array. More than 40,000 probes were received in 
total and these were used to statistically analyse the scan 
activity on the gateway array as shown in Fig. 4. The scans 
across multiple gateways from one or more source IP 
addresses appear as vertical bars within this graph because 
of the large scale of the x-axis. 
  These   scans  are   taking  place  over  a  time   interval  of  
between one minute and one hour, and will be referred to as 
‘fast’ or ‘normal’ scans (vertical lines). Generally these are 
occurring as quickly as the internet connection and 
processor speed of the attacking machine will allow. The 
diagonal lines on a 45-degree angle spanning a number of 
days are referred to as a ‘slow’ scan. These will have a far 
larger time interval between each individual probe of 
anywhere up to an hour, making them more difficult to 
detect. Using the Tracking module it is possible to track a 
single IP and watch what it has done over a period of time, 
Fig. 5 displays the methodicalness of a port scan across the 
entire range of the class C address as well as the fact the 
scan also covered multiple ports on each of the gateways. It 
is this style of attack that our implementation is attempting 
to detect, and act upon to protect the given network. 
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Fig. 5 .Port scan across multiple gateways and ports from a lone source IP 
CONTINUING WORK 
 
  The  implementation has  progressed on to  automating the  
process to allow it to occur in real-time, while also building 
in interaction between the Analysis and Tracking module. 
A third module has also been created called the Action 
module which examines the results produced by the other 
two and formulates a firewall rule to be sent to the 
gateways to provide protection from a multiple gateway 
attack. 
   The   goal  of  the   Action   module  is  be  a  pre-emptive  
defence mechanism to provide protection to the gateways 
on the network that have not yet been attacked by a given 
IP address. For this to be truly worthwhile the process 
needs to be efficient and operate at real-time during attacks. 
  The  current  work   on   the   system   is   also   aiming   at  
discovering the optimum ban length for attackers to prevent 
both long-term slow scans and attackers who return after a 
period of inactivity. This optimum length will be one of the 
heuristics considered when creating the firewall rules in 
response to a detected attack. 
 
RELATED WORK 
 
  There     have     been    continuous     developments    and  
advancements in the examination of electronic audit logs 
since the 1980’s. In recent times this research has branched 
into correlating data from multiple locations, even 
gateways. The MINDS project example is an example of 
such a system. 
  The MINDS [9] (Minnesota Intrusion Detection System) 
project has the objective of producing a system which will 
allow large scale analysis using data mining algorithms to 
detect attacks. It uses a combination of signature detection 
and anomaly detection to provide protection to the 
University of Minnesota network. 
  The MINDS system examines not only audit log data but 
also derived contextual information such as the amount of 
traffic to a destination from a specific source. The audit 
data is run through the Attack Detection Module (signature 
detection) and then the remainder fed through the Anomaly 
Detection Modules that allocates a score to each connection 
in relation to normal traffic patterns. Connections that score 
highly are then further analysed by the network 
administrators to moderate whether or not the connection 
was an intrusion or a false positive. Connections that scored 
highly by the Anomaly Module, and are not found to be 
false positives by the administrators, are then further 
analysed to produce new signatures for emerging attacks.  
As such the MINDS system is strong on the detection of 
novel attacks, or attacks which are not yet supported by 
many other IDS [10, 11]. 
  The MINDS project has been developed during the same 
period as our own system, and as such, there are some 
notable differences between the two implementations. The 
MINDS project does not employ threshold level heuristics 
in their detection mechanisms, and the system is not fully 
intended to be automated process. 
  Agent based approaches have also been implemented in 
recent years, analysing the audit data in a de-centralised 
manner [12]. No direct performance comparison with such 
a system has been completed at this point, it remains 
however an interesting research direction. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  In   conclusion,  this  paper   has   demonstrated  that  it   is  
possible to detect and indeed track malicious scans across a 
series of gateways through the centralised analysis of audit 
logs. Detecting such attacks is impossible for individual 
gateways spread across a network as they lack the 
contextual information to recognise the true aims of a 
single trivial probe against a port.  
  Once the central processing and analysis has occurred, and 
detected malicious source IP addresses it is possible to 
defend the remaining network gateways from future 
attacks. Such pre-emptive defence mechanisms will better 
equip network administrators to protect and maintain 
services to users within sizeable networks. 
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